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ALLisoN DUNHAM*
Some years ago an urban land economist observed that official city planning could
effectively pre-determine the future structure of a city only if "social controls" were
"applied to certain market forces or modifications ... made in the institutional frame-
work within which the market operates.... ." While it is possible that city planning
could influence market behavior merely by making information in the form of
"studies" available to private sellers and buyers who do not do their own market
analyses, the main influence of any city plan on the market comes from action which
deters or stimulates the making of choices of an owner as to use of his land. The
city plan is usually translated into action affecting the free market through zoning,
official street maps, subdivision control, housing and building codes, capital budget-
ing, and redevelopment legislation.
Perhaps it is because the constitutional basis of most planning legislation is found
in the "police power" or perhaps it is because the draftsmen of planning legislation
have been influenced by experience in drafting laws regulating saloons, bawdy
houses, and public nuisances, that we have looked mainly to the criminal law for
the "control" applied to the operation of the free market. While by hypothesis we
are trying to force property owners not to make decisions which they regard as
profitable, we have expected a fine, usually a small one, to deter such owners from
making these choices
Perhaps if planning had been in the hands of sympathetic "conveyancers" rather
than the municipal or constitutional lawyer we might have had a different emphasis.
We might have used the local real property tax as our model for enforcement rather
than the bawdy house ordinance. While some states may impose criminal sanctions
to force payment and some do impose personal responsibility for tax payment and
while there is always the threat that the taxing authority will foreclose the tax
"lien" if the tax is not paid, the main enforcement in practice comes from the
market consequences of the existence of the tax lien. This lien is an "encumbrance"
on the tide. Abstractors, conveyancers, and tide companies are employed by buyers
in the market to ferret out the "violation" (i.e., nonpayment) of the tax. In part
this is because of the strong tradition of the market that on sale title is to be
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Other controls have been: power in city to abate nuisances or enjoin violations; power to cut off
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"marketable" and in part it is because the "encumbrance" of the real property tax
violation brings into the enforcement picture another potent private group tending
to compel performance. Building and loan associations, banks, insurance companies,
and other regulated institutional lenders who supply the bulk of the capital in the
real estate market 3 are by law required to refuse to make loans on security of "en-
cumbered" tides. Moreover the priority which subsequent tax liens have over
earlier real estate mortgages forces these lenders, even though they have made a loan
on a clear title, to "police" the mortgagor-land-owner's management of the property
to see to it that he pays the tax. In short the real property tax is in large part
"enforced" by private enterprise itself because of the impact of the tax on the real
estate market. One need compare only the most conservative estimates in large
cities of the percentage of lots complying with the real property tax with the per-
centage of lots complying with planning laws to note the effectiveness of this method
of enforcement.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the existence of and the possibility of
similar and other methods of private enforcement of planning legislation. Juris-
prudentially it might be said that all enforcement is by the state. The rule of law
that the lien for the unpaid property tax is an encumbrance and that insurance com-
panies may not invest in a mortgage on such property is as much a rule of govern-
ment as the rule that a building code violation subjects the owner to a $2.oo per day
fine. But, for present purposes, we treat as "public" enforcement any judicial or ad-
ministrative proceeding initiated against land or its owner by appropriate govern-
ment officials to secure enforcement of planning laws.4 We treat with three types
of "private" enforcement in this paper: (I) enforcement arising from the operation
of the real estate market as a result of some rule of law affecting the commodity,
marketing practices or institutions; (2) enforcement by means of direct legal pro-
ceedings commenced by private citizens or associations of citizens against the vi-
olators of city planning legislation; and (3) enforcement by means of initiation of
public prosecutions by private persons. Types two and three are most nearly
analogous to "public" enforcement since but for a difference in initiator of the
legal proceedings the type of relief is substantially the same.
I
ENFORCEMENT THROUGH UTILIZATION OF THE MARKET AND ITS INSTITUTIONS
Planning legislation is complied with the more, the more it affects the self-interest
of landowners. Thus if fines are large enough and certain enough, it may be un-
profitable for an owner not to comply. But the controls on the market considered
in this section of the paper operate more directly on marketing forces and practices
'See ERNEST Me. FISHER, URBAN REAL ESTnAm MARKETS: CItARACTERISTICS AND FINANCING 66 (195I)
for volume of mortgage loans by type of lender. The institutions mentioned in the text furnish 73.2
per cent of mortgage capital in the real estate market.
'For a detailed treatment of many types of public enforcement, see MCGOLDRIcX, GRAUIARD, AND
HOROWITZ, op. cit. supra note 2, c. 8.
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rather than directly on the owner and through him on the market. Controls con-
sidered here directly affect the merchantability of the product.
Violation of planning legislation may make the landowner's product less mer-
chantable, by: (A) threatening the income forthcoming from the property; (B)
making it difficult to adhere to established management and marketing practices;
and (C) rendering the title defective so that buyers and lenders will not or cannot
purchase an interest in his commodity.
A. Threatening the Income from the Property
The most direct impact on income from violating property is that found in
statutes such as Section 302 of the New York Multiple Dwelling Law which provide
that a tenant in a building without certain certificates need not pay rent and that a
landlord cannot evict him for such non-payment. This statutory remedy is a radical
departure from the common law where the tenant's only excuse for non-payment of
rent arises from a "constructive eviction," that is, the premises become so untenantable
through a violation of a landlord's duty, that the tenant is obliged to remove himself
from the premises and is excused thereafter from paying rent.5 It is suspected that
compliance with this type of planning law would come with unparalleled speed if the
occupants of violating builders were armed with an effective club of continued occu-
pancy without rent payments until the owner razed the building or obeyed the
statute. However this New York statutory remedy has not been effective. It is not
available for violations generally but only for failure to have a certificate of oc-
cupancy. But its big weakness stems from a misconception of the nature of the
rental market in substandard housing. The landlord is "outlawed" from court
only for actions for non-payment of rent. Since most tenancies in substandard
housing are of relatively short term the landlord can, by appropriate notice, terminate
the tenancy shortly after the tenant refuses to pay rent and thereafter evict the non-
paying tenant even though the building violates the law. This substantially reduces
the risk of loss of income to the landlord, particularly if there is a brisk demand
for this type of housing.6
The income from rental property may be affected by another type of law.' In
some jurisdictions, such as California, a tenant can, on his own motion, repair a sub-
'See generally on this doctrine, 2 RicHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW op REAL PROPERTY §227 (1950).
' Until 1950 there was an additional threat to the landlord. He could not, under Sec. 260 of the
Multiple Dwelling Law, dispossess a tenant in a violating building who refused to pay a rent larger
than the lowest rent charged for any month between September 1937 and March 1938. After many
extensions this remedy was allowed to expire in 1950.
In Detroit Hits Code Violators in Pocketbooks With Old Law, 12 J. HousiNo 61 (1955), it is re-
ported that a Detroit ordinance prohibiting collection of rent in buildings as to which notice to vacate
has been served is now being enforced. For statutes similar to that in the text, see CONN. GEN. STAT.
tit. 30, c. x96, § 4080 (949); IowA CODE ANN. §413.Io6 (954); MicH. STAT. ANN. §5.287 (949).
See generally, 144 A.L.R. 259 (1943).
'States which impose tort liability for breach of the statutory duty of repair also indirectly "threaten"
the income of a non-complying owner by increasing his insurance risk. See 2 POWELL, op. cit. supra
note 5, §238.
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standard building and withhold rent until reimbursed for his expenditures.8 This
remedy is also a substantial change from traditional landlord and tenant doctrines
but it is ineffective because it is subject to contract between landlord and tenant.
B. Making It Difficult to Adhere to Established Practices of
Property Management and Marketing
A penalty for violation of planning legislation may "upset" established practices in
property management. Thus many housing and building codes provide that the
statutory fine or imprisonment falls on the rent collector, management agent, con-
tractor, and architect as well as the owner.9 Other practices on which planning
might impinge are those concerning insurance, mortgages, and marketing by refer-
ence to a map.
Violations of planning legislation may affect an insurance policy in several ways.
Thus some violations may cause a policy to be avoided under a clause making a
policy void in case of ordinance violations; or the violation may result in an "in-
creased hazard" exception to loss under the policy; or it may avoid or suspend the
policy on a theory of illegal use; or the violation may cause a breach of warranty.10
The above possibilities exist only when the violation has some relation to risk (e.g.,
violation of electrical code) and the reluctance of courts to construe policies to except
losses which have occurred makes this method of enforcement not too effective. A
stronger possibility would arise from inducing insurance companies to cancel or
threaten to cancel policies on violating properties. In some communities the method
is used with respect to fire laws. To compel the insurance industry to participate
would appear to require legislation in most states. Where the state supervisory
agency has power to prescribe a standard policy form, a cooperating insurance com-
missioner might be prevailed upon to insert a cancellation or avoidance clause in
the policy. But the supervisory agency does not, in normal cases, seem to extend to
compelling companies to establish a practice of cancellation on notification of a vio-
lation or to compelling establishment of a differential rate classification for violating
or non-violating properties.1 '
The threat of cancellation whether obtained by agreement or compulsion is
effective, however, because of the impact of cancellation on another private agency-
the mortgagee. Many mortgages provide for a default and possible acceleration of the
mortgage if the mortgagor fails to carry insurance.12
SSee CAL. CIv. CODE §1942 (1949); MONT. REV. CODE tit. 42, §42-202 (1947); N.D. REV. CODE
C. 47, §47-1613 (I943); OKLA. S-TAT. tit. 41, §32 (1951); and S.D. CODE §38.0410 (1939).
. See McGoLDRiE, GRAUBARD, AND HOROWIrZ, op. cit. rupra note 4, at 458; N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELL-
ING LAw §305 (946).
"°For an "increase in hazard" clause, see New York Standard Fire Policy, N.Y. INs. LAw §68(5)
(1949). See generally on the defenses of the insurer relating to violations, VANCE ON INSURANCE §146
(3rd ed. 1951); JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACMCE §2871 (alteration of premises),
§2878 (change in class of occupation and use), and §2880 (illegal use) (194i).
" See N.Y. INS. LAw §169 (1949) on power to prescribe policy forms. For rating powers see
N.Y. INS. LAw §§x81-189 (1949).
"2 For some institutional lenders this provision is required for eligibility of mortgage. See, e.g.,
Illinois Building and Loan Law, ILL. REv. STAT. C. 32, §231(b) (i951).
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Another established management practice is the use of borrowed capital which
is repaid to the creditor at stated intervals in the future. In New York by statute
and in many states by mortgage clause a mortgagee has power to accelerate payments
of mortgage principal in case of violation of municipal ordinances applicable to the
mortgaged property. 3 These clauses tend to secure compliance with the local ordi-
nance only to the extent that mortgagees establish a practice of exercising their con-
tractual or statutory power of declaring the mortgage in default if violations are not
cleared up. If such a practice were firmly established there is no doubt that this
would seriously interfere with established management practices of landowners and
could compel compliance. In some communities property owners' associations have
a policy of reporting violations to mortgagees of record and this has frequently in-
duced compliance.
Without a certain amount of compulsion or obvious self interest it is unlikely
that a mortgage lender will exercise his power of acceleration on a mortgage on which
the mortgagor is making regular payments, perhaps only because of the increased
income resulting from his violation of planning laws. While the journals and books
of the mortgage industry abound with articles and advice about the necessity of
"servicing" a mortgage by periodic inspections to see to it that the mortgagor does
not "milk" the property by causing excessive deterioration, the mortgage lender does
not yet realize that the building department could be made an adjunct of his own
servicing department by giving him the reports of the government inspectors.
Perhaps the planning legislation which has the clearest recognition of the use
of market forces to obtain enforcement is the subdivision control legislation. While
most subdivision control laws have various forms of criminal penalties, the central
theme of enforcement is that unapproved plats of a subdivision are not entitled to
recordation. 4 The assumption of such a "penalty" seems to be that the custom of
describing property by reference to maps is so strong and so convenient that the
subdivider will submit his map for approval even though there is in most such laws
a technical "loop-hole" permitting use of a metes and bounds description. If the
recorder does his job there is something more than a mere threat of a fine to a sub-
divider for using an unapproved map-he cannot use the short-hand method of
describing his land which the marketing institutions approve.
Many subdivision laws make further use of the market as a method of enforce-
ment. Some provide that an unapproved map even though mistakenly filed is not a
matter of record; that sales from such maps may be avoided by purchasers; that
public improvements cannot be located by municipal governments in unofficial streets
(which streets on unapproved maps are said to be); and that building permits
will not be issued for buildings facing on unapproved streets 5
"
3 N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW §302 (1946).
14 See generally, H. W. LAuTNER, StmDvissoN REGULATONS 28 (94)-
1 See, e.g., Maryland-Washington Regional District Subdivision Control Law, Md. Laws 1943, c.
992, §2, as amended.
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Several weaknesses appear however in this method of enforcement. One is that
the burden of many of the penalties may fall on one of the classes of persons which
the subdivision control ordinance is supposed to protect from his own folly. One
purpose of such legislation is to protect a buyer from hardship resulting when he
improvidently relies on assurances of speculative developers about the nature of
the subdivision. Giving this buyer the power to avoid his contract assumes that he
has a knowledge of his legal rights after breach which it is assumed he did not
have before he purchased, and the power of the city to withhold building permits
for buildings on unapproved lots may put the full onus for noncompliance on this
same betrayed buyer."0 To the extent however that the merchandizing of a sub-
division requires a developer to market a finished product rather than a vacant lot,
the onus of compliance for purposes of building permits is put upon the developer.
A further weakness in this legislation arises from the fact that the territorial
limits of the recording office include units of government which have and some which
do not have this type of ordinance and there is no effective procedure in most states
to bring home to the recorder the idea that in some areas he must not record plats
without planning approval and with respect to other areas he may. This has re-
sulted in considerable error on the part of recorders in recording maps which should
not be recorded.: 7
Finally the legislation did not clearly establish that title to lots in an unap-
proved subdivision is unmarketable.
One advantage of this type of legislation is that it appears to be the practice of
institutional lenders to insist on proof of compliance with the subdivision law before
they will commit themselves to a developer to loan on security of housing constructed
in the subdivision. Thus both the Federal Housing Administration and the Vet-
eran's Administration refuse to give a commitment for insured mortgages on prop-
erty in a new subdivision without proof of compliance with the subdivision laws."8
Thus the marketing practice of conveying by reference to a recorded map and
the practice of the subdivider obtaining commitments of mortgages for his prospec-
tive mortgages tend to insure compliance with the subdivision control laws in urban
areas.
C. Violations of Planning Legislation and Marketable Title
If violations of planning legislation render the tide defective, we have perhaps
the most significant method of private enforcement yet discussed. If such is the rule
then we have something which tends to produce some compliance every time the
property is sold commercially or a mortgage loan placed on the property.
Does a violation of planning legislation render the title defective? The case
"
8 Note, Wrongful Subdivision Approval by the Plan Commission-Remedies of the Buyer and City,
29 IND. L. J. 408 (1954); Note, Land Subdivision Control, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1226 (1952).
'" Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, ['953] Wis. L. REv. 389.
"
5 INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASS'N, LOCAL PLANNING ADIINISTRATION 255 (2d ed. 1948) re-
ports FHA refuses to issue commitments on houses on unapproved lots. See, e.g., FHA, MININ'IUM
PROPERTY REQUIREMENTS FOR CHICAGO DIsTRICT.
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law would seem to answer this question in the affirmative.'" If a subdivision control
law provides that a plat improperly recorded is not a matter of record it would
seem that an improperly recorded plat is a matter of tide2° just as absence of a prop-
erly acknowledged deed (although recorded) may be a matter of tide. Certainly
this would seem to be the rule in so far as the vendor's obligation is to convey a
record title because absence of a recorded map would mean that the purchaser's
title with respect to easements in streets and other public places shown on the map
would be unrecorded even though the description of the lot by reference to an un-
recorded plat is a sufficient description to convey (as between grantor and grantee).
The Hocking?' case from California does not seem to be contrary to this con-
clusion. In that case an insured who had purchased a lot in a subdivision as to
which the map was erroneously approved by the city council sought to hold his title
insurance company on his tide policy insuring marketability, after he discovered
that in spite of what appeared to be an approved plat, the city officials would not
give him a building permit to build on his lots. The majority of the Supreme Court,
over a sharp dissent, held that the claim was not covered by the policy. Several
grounds not involving our problem were available for the decision. The Court said
that under the terms of the policy loss had not been established even though the
defect was a matter of tide; it said that plaintiff was not really objecting to tide but
to the quality of the premises. In so far as the majority meant by this that the
refusal to issue a building permit was not a defect of tide there may be no quarrel
with the decision. But as the dissent pointed out there was a tide defect if a lot
owner purchased a lot which did not face on a public street or appurtenant to which
there were easements in his favor not of record 2 The majority pointed to language
in the California statute which seemed to say that if the approval of the city council
was endorsed on the map, as it was, the map was "duly recorded,"2 3 thus implying
that if the map had been unrecorded or recorded without city council approval a
title defect would have existed. That part of the statute, not referred to by the
majority, giving the purchaser or the government power to cancel the sale would
also seem to create a defective tide2 4
An opinion of the Attorney General of Wisconsin25 seems to hold that a viola-
tion of a subdivision control statute does not render the title defective but in
Massachusetts the Land Court refuses to register tide to lots in an unapproved sub-
"0 See Dunham, Eflect of Violations of Building Covenants and of Zoning Ordinances on Title, 27
Rociy Mr. L. REV. - 0955).
2' Cleveland v. Bergen Bldg. & Imp. Co., 55 Ad. 117 (N.J. Ct. Ch. 1903); Morris v. Avondale
Heights Co., 218 Ky. 356, 291 S.W. 752 (1926). See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §12.124 (Casner
ed. 1952) and cases cited.
"1 Hocking v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 37 Cal.2d 644, 234 P.2d 625 (ig5), commented upon
in 4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, 1951-1952 222.
" See cases cited in note 2o, supra.
" CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE C. 2, art. Io, §11628 (1951).
"4 Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 95, 216 P.2d i (1950). Bstt cf. Land Title, C. N.
Marques, 37 Hawaii 260 (1945).
20 34 Ops. Avr'y GEN. Wis. 29o (1945).
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division." To avoid this doubt clarifying legislation is needed in most states2
"Violations" of official street map ordinances-that is buildings built in the beds of
mapped but unopened streets without permit-seem to render the tide defective," as
do violations of zoning ordinances.29- Violations of building and housing codes
would seem to be in the same category as violations of zoning ordinances, although
the New York cases seem to distinguish zoning and restrictive covenant violations
from building and housing code violations.80 However, it appears to be the practice
of tide companies in New York to report, at the time they prepare a tide report, on
all uncorrected violations of record in the building department31 This would seem
to indicate some practice at least treating this type of violation as a matter of title.
While the above may be the result of the cases, this assumes significance for our
purposes only if the title examining industry reports these violations as they do the
real property tax lien and if those forces in the market interested in the quality of
the seller's tide take into account violations of planning laws in their own actions.
There is very little evidence that the tide examining industry and the institutions
of the market treat these matters as matters of title.
Abstractors usually examine only the "record tide" and lawyers examining ab-
stracts base their opinions only on the record therein disclosed. With the exception
of the status of the subdivision map which is a matter of record; building code
violations as to which "notices" have been sent and are on file in the office of the
building department; and master street plan maps which are on file in some appro-
priate city office-most violations cannot possibly be said to be a matter of record
but are only matters discoverable on some kind of inspection or survey. Surveyors
seem to show lot lines and any violation of set-back lines in zoning ordinances on
their surveys but do not ordinarily show violations of other bulk restrictions (e.g.,
height) and never a violation of a use restriction of a zoning ordinance. The usual
inspection report seems to be directed to mechanics liens and "possessory" claims
and not to obvious violations of planning legislation.82 Thus, most of the title
industry concerned with records, inspections, and surveys do not seem to pick-up
violations in these customary title reports.
"0 See MAss. ANN. LAws c. 41, §8iFF (1954 Cum. Supp.). Before this statute clarified the situation
there was considerable shock at this conclusion among conveyancers. See Tyler, Pitfalls in Title Exam-
inations, 35 MAss. L. Q. 21, 26 (Sept. 1950).
" See Mass. Laws 1953, c. 674, §7, amending c. 41, §8x, MAss. ANN. LAws.
2 Petterson v. Radspi Realty and Coal Corp., 29o N.Y. 645, 49 N.E.2d 65 (943); Bibber v. Weber,
102 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sp. Term 1951); Agliata v. D'Agostino, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1953, p. 1524, col. I.
2'Carlish v. Salt, [19o6] i Ch. 335; Moyer v. De Vincentis Construction Co., 107 Pa. Super. 588,
164 Ad. 111 (1933); Lohmeyer v. Bower, 17o Kan. 442, 227 P.2d 102 (1951).
'o Woodenbury v. Spier, 122 App. Div. 396, io6 N.Y. Supp. 817 (2d Dep't 1907). See also Millman
v. Swan, 141 Va. 312, 127 S.E. 166 (1925).
"' Speech of William Wolfman, Counsel, New York Title Guaranty & Trust Co., before the Round
Table on Property, at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, in New York
City, Dec. 28-30, 1954. In Detroit, notices of violations are now being recorded in the realty records.
See Detroit Hits Code Violators in Pocketbooks With Old Law, 12 J. HousiNG 61 (1955).
1 See, e.g., "Certificate of Inspection and Possession" required by Regulations for the Preparation
of Title Evidence in Land Acquisition by the United States.
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Furthermore, title insurance companies, even those purporting to insure market-
ability, usually attempt to limit their liability so as to exclude "governmental acts"
and the violation thereof.O3
The American Title Association Loan Policy which is available only to lenders,
and is not issued everywhere, purports to be an exceptionless policy but it also ex-
cludes from its coverage insurance "against action by any governmental agency for
the purpose of regulating occupancy or use of said land or any building or struc-
ture thereon." It is not clear, however, that this relieves the title insurance com-
pany issuing this policy from liability in the situation where zoning law enforcement
proceedings are commenced by private citizens instead of by a governmental agency.
Nor do institutional lenders and their government supervisors insist on the
position taken by the cases. As far as is known there are no statutes which ex-
pressly make a loan on security of land in violation of planning legislation an in-
eligible investment for the regulated investor. Neither are there any statutes which
in express terms require a marketable title for an eligible investment. The statutes
regulating banks, building and loan associations, insurance companies, and other
regulated investors require the loan either to be secured by a "first" mortgage (or
lien)3 4 or to be one on security of "unencumbered""3 real estate or sometimes require
that the security be both a "first lien" and upon "unencumbered real estate."3 6
While it has been suggested that this language does not compel the institutional
lender to insist on marketable title 7 it is doubtful that this conclusion can be main-
tained. Unless an "encumbrance" is considered only a monetary lien, those statutes
which require unencumbered real estate would dearly make ineligible investments
in loans secured by mortgages on land encumbered with easements, encroachments,
and other "encumbrances." A violation of a zoning ordinance which subjects the
purchaser to the hazards of litigation would seem to be as much an encumbrance
as an encroachment. That an encumbrance embraces most of the customary title
defects seems to be the common understanding for the wordV8
The "first lien" statutes present a slightly different problem of construction, how-
ever, since technically property subject to an easement of way, for example, could
"Thus the tide insurance policy in the Hocking case, supra note 21, excepted from coverage "any
governmental act or regulations restricting, regulating or prohibiting the occupancy or use of said
land or any building or structure thereon."
But it is reported that some title policies now insure against zoning violations. Henley, Report of
Committee on Standard Forms, 28 TITLE NEws 25 (February, 1949).
" See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. C. 73, §737()(e) (951) (life insurance companies); COL. Rv. STAT.
§14-1-33 (I953) (banks); Osno REv. CODE §§II05.19 and io9.o8 (1953) (banks and building and
loan associations); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 168, §54 (savings banks); Federal Reserve Act, 38 STAT. 273
(1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §371 (1952 Supp.); Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 58 STAT. 1291
(1944), as amended, 38 U.S.C. §694 (1952 Supp.).
"See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS, c. 175, §63 (1948); N.J. REv. STAT. §17:21-1(C) (1937).
"CAL. INS. CooE §1176 (1950); ORa. REV. STAT. §738.250 0953).
"REEvEs, GUARANTEEING MARKETABILITY OF TITLES TO REAL ESTATE i8 (95) (unpublished, for
use of Chicago Title and Trust Co.).
"Thus many insurance statutes provide that building restrictions, leases, and liens for current taxes
are not to be encumbrances within the meaning of the statute. N.Y. INS. LAw §81(6) (1949).
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qualify as property on which the mortgage would be a "first lien." But again some-
thing more than a technical first lien is the common understanding. Perhaps this
results from the fiduciary nature of the investor's duty which presumably requires
him to be "prudent" even within the permissible field. Trustees are required by
the "prudent" requirement to invest in mortgages on land as to which the title is
marketable. 9
The mortgage industry practice is not clear40 but tends, as does the policy of the
government supervisors,41 to accept a title insurance policy as complete proof of
eligibility of tide. The Veterans Administration's regulation under a "first lien
statute" best represents the prevailing attitude: tide to the mortgaged land satisfies
the requirements if it is "acceptable to informed buyers, tide companies and at-
torneys generally in the community in which the property is located. '42
The practice of two United States government agencies insuring mortgages on
urban real estate is revealing in connection with our problem. As indicated earlier
both the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration
(VA), before they commit themselves to insure loans in a newly established de-
velopment, do require the applicant (developer or builder) to submit proof of com-
pliance with local subdivision and zoning laws 3 But this is the practice of neither
agency when either old housing or isolated new construction is involved.
Thus, the Solicitor of the VA has ruled that a violation of a zoning ordinance
does not destroy eligibility of the security but he admonishes the appraisers to take
this into account in valuing the property.44 In short, the VA, under its statutory
authority, limits its function to that of seeing to it that the veteran and the Federal
Government get value for their investments; it is not concerned with or responsible
to the community in which the veteran purchases.
The FHA operating under a similar type of guaranty legislation seems to draw
a line in its regulations between "big" and "little" business. If a developer is seek-
ing approval for loans on housing in a subdivision, on multiple dwellings of twelve
or more units under the Section 207 program or on a co-operative housing project
(Section 213), proof must be submitted of compliance with local government regu-
lations 5 If, however, the application is for insurance of a loan on a single one-to-
"' Gilbert v. Kolb, 85 Md. 627, 37 Ad. 423 (897); In re Roach's Estate, 50 Ore. 179, 92 Pac. si8
(r907).
40 Letters to the author from general counsel of six large life insurance companies indicate that in
loans on new construction five of the six companies check for both building and zoning laws. On old
buildings only one checked for zoning and building code violations, and one said their "appraisers" took
this into account.
"In letters to the author from the Insurance Commissioners of Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey,
and New York only the latter expected the title insurance policy to show zoning violations. Illinois re-
fused even to see a problem as it accepts title insurance as complete proof apparently even for matters
against which title insurance does not insure.
4238 CODE FED. REG. §36.4350(r)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1954). This was added June 12, 1950, 15
FED. REG. 4398 (X950).
' See note i8 supra.
"' VA SOL. Op. No. 22-49 (1949); id., x86-47 (947).
"Reg. 232 (for Sec. 207 mortgages on multi-family housing), and Reg. 241 (for Sec. 213 mort-
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four family unit (Section 203), on an individual dwelling unit in a co-operative
project (Section 213), on property in an urban renewal area of a one-to-four family
type (Section 22o), or for a Title I home improvement loan, the regulations do not
require, as a condition of insurance, any proof as to compliance with local planning
ordinances.40 Since the loan is insured, there is of course no incentive on the lender
to undertake his own investigation as to such violations. Indeed, most statutes
establishing tide and other standards for eligible mortgages specifically remove almost
all restraints if the VA or FHA insures4Y
In the light of the purposes of the VA loan system it may not be improper for
the VA to ignore local planning; his job was to get the veteran a home-at least the
VA can say it was no more than that. But the same cannot be said of the FHA.
Almost since the original National Housing Act and at least since the Housing
Act of 1949, the Federal Government program of insured loans and grants for
housing has had a planning element among its objectives. Since 1949 some kinds
of federal aid to municipalities have been conditioned on the performance record
of the local community in having adequate planning and enforcement.48 The 1954
Act requires, as a condition to certain grants, loans, and mortgage insurance, that a
city have a "positive" program for prevention of blight and it establishes a new
objective-the rehabilitation of older areas of the city.49 It seems highly indefensible
for the FHA, particularly in areas set aside for urban renewal, to require no check
on violations caused by home improvements under Tide I nor on violations en-
couraged by liberal loan policies on old one-to-four family buildings. On the one
hand, the Housing and Home Finance Administration is chiding cities for not
enforcing their planning laws and threatening if they do not improve, to with-
hold grants in aid necessary to help the cities "renew" or "redevelop" deteriorated
parts of the city; but, on the other hand, it is telling local banks and builders that
the FHA does not care whether they loan, at government risk, to private owners
who illegally convert or repair old buildings, thus adding to the blighted conditions
in the very cities the FHA says it is trying to save. Almost the best proof city
officials could offer the administrator of the urban renewal program that the city
has a workable program to stop blight would be to give him a copy of a memoran-
dum from the administrator of the housing mortgage insurance program instructing
gages on cooperative housing projects). Reg. 28o also provided for proof of zoning compliance in the now
expired Sec. 6o8 program. All of these regulations are in 24 CODE FED. REGS. (Cum. Supp. 1954).
0 Reg. 22X (for Sec. 203 mortgages on one-to-four family housing); Reg. 243 (for individual
mortgages released from lien of cooperative projet mortgage); Reg. 261 (for i-1i family dwellings in
rehabilitation area under Sec. 220); and Reg. 201 (alteration, repair and improvement induding con-
version of existing housing-Title I loans). All are found in 24 CODE FED. REGS. (Cum. Supp. 1954).
It is true however that in Section 203 loans on new construction FHA Manual, Minimum Property
Requirements for Properties, specifies that the development shall conform to local zoning, building and
construction laws. This is not required for existing construction.
'"See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw §81(6) (949).
"SSee Title I, Housing Act of 1949, 63 STAT. 413 (949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1441 et seq.
(1952 Supp.).
' Section 303 of Housing Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 623, 42 U.S.C.A. §1451 (1954 Supp.).
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lenders and builders that insurance would no longer be available for loans without
proof of compliance with most, if not all, local planning laws.
It is no answer to this problem to instruct the appraisers to take "violations" into
account in establishing value because often the illegal use is an intensification of use
which may well increase the value of the property. Nor is it a defense of the FHA
that violations are difficult to police. As a minimum the same kind of certificate or
affidavit from the city or local lender as is used in other areas of FHA supervision
could be required."
Before this method of enforcement is fully embraced by city planners, some of
the possible consequences should be noted. If planning violations are to be made
such a tide defect that the institutions of the market must take cognizance of such
violations, it would seem that these private institutions are entitled to insist on at
least three conditions: (i) that there be a machinery available whereby they can
obtain from the enforcing officials a definitive statement that there is or is not a vio-
lation as of a particular date; (2) a statute of limitations so that if the planning viola-
tion is not caught by the city official within a specified time the property is freed
from the regulation; and (3) an adequate public record of the violations or re-
strictions available to tide examiners and indexed in a manner to which the examin-
ing industry is accustomed.
While there seems to be-some statutory development toward imposing a statute
of limitations,5 the present situation is almost intolerable on the other points. In
subdivision regulations, for example, state enabling legislation usually authorizes
municipalities to impose such regulation on land within its municipal boundaries
and sometimes on an extra-territorial area as well. Land records, kept by larger
units of government-usually counties-cover both areas without such legislation
and areas with it. Under present laws there is nothing in the county office contain-
ing the land records to tell the examiner whether a subdivision map on file in that
office should have been approved or not, or whether the approval noted thereon was
by the proper officials, or whether the officials can go behind their own approval
and later upset it.5 Likewise, municipal offices charged with enforcement of zoning,
building codes, and housing laws have in many cities no adequate records of viola-
r°See, e.g., certificate concerning prevailing wage, 24 CODE FED. REGS. §232.1g(d)( 4 ) (Cum. Supp.
'954).
"See N.Y. GEN. CiTY LAw §35-a (1954 Gum. Supp.): if no action commenced within fifteen years
to revoke building permit erroneously issued for building in bed of mapped street, permit is valid.
Added by N.Y. Laws 1954, c. 775. See also MAss. LAws ANN. C. 41, §8SY-one year statute of
limitations on proceedings against violation of subdivision law.
"
5 In 1953 Massachusetts made provision in its subdivision law for many of these problems. Mass.
Laws 1953, c. 674. The subdivision ordinance is not effective until register of deeds is notified of its
existence; the Planning Board is required to record its regulations and also to state on request whether
a particular area is subject to regulation or not. N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW §301(5) (1946) pro-
vides that a certificate or record in building department may be relied upon by any good faith pur-
chaser or lender.
In Seat v. Louisville & Jefferson County Land Co., 2i9 Ky. 418, 293 S.W. 986 (1927) only by taking
"judicial notice" of absence of a planning ordinance in Louisville was the court able to determine
whether a plat was recorded.
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tions and notices which can be checked by the tide examiner. Finally, the street
plan ordinances, as well as the zoning ordinance, are overly optimistic about future
development. There should be some provision, just as there is for restrictive cove-
nants, whereby these ordinances prospective in operation cease to be effective after
a period of time if development does not take place.
Up to this point we have been concerned with the existence of an encumbrance
at the time of a transfer of some interest in land. The real property tax has an
additional impact on title-that tax for any year is by law made a lien senior to that
of an earlier mortgage so that a mortgage, an eligible investment when made, may
become ineligible by subsequent conduct of the mortgagor. This induces lending
institutions to police their mortgagors. Absent a statute making a subsequent viola-
tion an encumbrance on the tide under a mortgage such a result would not occur
with respect to planning violations.
One such attempt was made in the field of planning. New York, on the analogy
of taxes and special assessments, attempted to make the city's lien for improvements
on private property made by the city in order to bring the building into compliance,
senior to existing mortgages. This, if effective, would of course put the mortgagee
clearly in the position of being policeman for the city. There would be no consti-
tutional objection to such a statute if it were made applicable only to mortgages
executed after its effective date and as to violations thereafter occurring. It was
held unconstitutional, however, as to a mortgage which antedated the statute.53 The
court was impressed with the argument that while a mortgagor could avoid the lien
as to his interest by closing up the building instead of permitting its repair, the mort-
gagee had no power to do this until after foreclosure and, in the meantime, an agree-
ment between the city and the mortgagor could subordinate a mortgage to a lien for
improvements which would otherwise be junior to the mortgage. Subsequent de-
velopments in the constitutional concept of "due process" may have weakened
the authority of this case. 4
Another route to the same end has been suggested in Chicago. 55 In an equity
proceeding to abate a nuisance, the petitioner can ask for the appointment of a re-
ceiver to abate the nuisance. On appointment, the receiver's obligations incurred in
abating the nuisance (making the repairs) would be senior to the lien of the mort-
gagee."' Whenever a violation results in a nuisance, this concept of equity receiver-
ships gives the city an additional weapon to induce the mortgagee to police the man-
agement of the property by the mortgagor.
"' Central Savings Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 51 (1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 661 (1938). See Note, 39 COL. L. REV. 889 (1939), for history of this statute.
" Thus giving the state a prior lien on railroad property for the railroad's share of the cost of
grade-crossing elimination has been upheld against claims under earlier mortgages. New York v. Geb-
hardt, 15 F.2d 8o2 (2d Cir. 1945).
Gr20 OPS. CORP. COUNSEL OF CHICAGO 167, at 174-177 (No. Ioogg).
" JAs. L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RECEIVERS §796 (3rd ed. 1894); 1 POMEROY, EQUITABLE
REmEDIEs §220 (1905). Cf. New York Dock Co. v. Steamship Poznan, 274 U.S. 117, at 121 (1927);
Attorney General v. Vigor, i1 Ves. 563, 32 Eng. Rep. 1207 (Ch. 1805).
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II
ENFORCEMENT BY DmcRT ACTION BY PRIVATE PERSONS
The most frequently thought of method of enforcement other than public en-
forcement is private action by a private citizen to compel a violator of planning laws
to comply. This method may be authorized in the enabling legislation"' or may be
available by application of equity principles.
If the planning legislation declares a violation to be a "public nuisance" this
neither detracts from, nor adds to the power of the citizen to seek an injunction
against the same violation. Neither does the equity maxim that it will not enjoin
violation of the criminal law detract from whatever right the plaintiff has. Absent
express statutory authority, the right of a private citizen to seek an injunction
against a violator of city planning is based on the theory of private nuisance-i.e.,
action of the defendant which has caused "special damage" to the plaintiff.
On this theory it is difficult to imagine a situation where private enforcement
of subdivision control law or the master street plan could be obtained."" With respect
to zoning, the case law fairly consistently permits a neighboring property owner
to seek an injunction against violation of the zoning ordinance."0 The problem for
the plaintiff, in any type of planning legislation, is that of establishing "special
damage" different from damage to the public generally. Sometimes this issue is
avoided by the court saying that the zoning ordinance was passed for the benefit of
the neighboring property owner or that there is a presumption of "special damage"
to neighboring property owners.00 This avoids the question whether the damage
to the plaintiff must be different in kind or only in degree from that suffered by the
public at large since it is well established that a private citizen cannot compel com-
pliance with a law to protect himself from damage which he suffers as a member of
the public. Since one of the major objectives of a zoning ordinance is to prevent
commingling of "incompatible" uses it is not difficult for the plaintiff to establish
some special damage arising from proximity. 1  This is more difficult, in theory,
where the objective of the zoning ordinance is something other than orderliness of
uses. Thus it might be difficult for a neighboring property owner to enjoin a violation
of a section of the zoning ordinance whose objective is to control the intensity of the
use of the city's services. However, the case law has not drawn this fine a line in
most states and if the plaintiff's property is near the defendant's he is permitted to
enjoin the violation almost on that fact alone.
A much more difficult question is private enforcement of housing and building
" See, e.g., Omo. REV. CODE §303.24 (1953); ILL. REV. STAT. C. 24, §73-9 (1953).
"' Massachusetts has given ten taxpayers the right to enforce subdivision control laws. MAss. ANN.
LAws c. 4r, §81Y (952).
"' The leading case is Welton v. 40 E. Oak St. Bldg. Corp., 7o F.2d 377 (7th Cir. x934), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 590 (1934). See 2 E. C. YOKLEY ZONING LAw AND PRACTICE §192 and cases cited (2d ed.
1953); 8 McQUIL.IN, MUNICIPAL COEPOexrAONS §25.343 (3 d ed. 595o).
" Welton v. 40 E. Oak St. Bldg. Corp., supra note 59.
6 See Note, Injunction, Right to Maintain .ction for Violation of Zoning Ordinance, 21 B.U.L. REv.
556 (941).
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codes. Much, if not most, of the provisions of this type of law are designed to pro-
tect the health and safety of occupants of the buildings regulated. While such
occupants might have the benefit of the special damage rule as applied in the zoning
cases, there would be no presumption of special damage entitling the neighboring
property owners to seek an injunction. Occasionally a section of the building code,
such as the prevention of wooden buildings in certain fire districts, is said to'be for
the protection of neighboring properties and a private injunction is allowed. 2
Yet it is the enforcement of these codes which mean so much to stabilization and
protection of neighborhoods under any kind of neighborhood conservation program.
On analysis it would seem that the problem of private enforcement of these laws is
not that of establishing special damage to the plaintiff differing from that suffered
by the public but is rather that of establishing a kind of damage recognizable in
the law of nuisance. Basically what the neighboring property owner is asserting
is that a violation of these codes by the defendant so deteriorates the neighborhood
that the violation adversely affects his property values and the satisfactions and
enjoyment which having property in this neighborhood gives him. Is this recog-
nizable damage?
The right to be protected in a private nuisance action is the right to quiet and
undisturbed enjoyment of neighboring property. If the defendant's conduct impairs
the health and comfort of the possessor (e.g., smoke, dust, odor, noise, light, heat),
the conduct is easily held to be a nuisance. But in our situation the plaintiff's hurt
is analogous to that suffered in the cases dealing with the funeral home, cemetery,
bawdy house, contagious disease hospital, and the junk yard as a nuisance.e3 In
planning cases the defendant's conduct rarely affects plaintiff's health or safety-it
reduces the satisfactions which he obtains from his own property. Courts have been
hesitant in permitting this kind of damage to support a nuisance action, partly out of
fear of protecting an unusually sensitive plaintiff against what appears to be
reasonable conduct of the defendant and partly out of the difficulty of weighing
the relative merit of defendant's and plaintiff's socially desirable uses. Here there
can be no doubt as to the unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct and of its
non-utility to the public; the public has declared that it does not want defendant's
activity to occur, or at least to occur where it is. The court could reduce its worry
about protecting super-sensitive plaintiffs if it would make use of the readily avail-
able evidence of the extent of the plaintiff's attitude among the public generally.
For, if the public generally shares the plaintiff's satisfactions from land use, then
the demand for the plaintiff's property in the market will decline and the value
of his property will be reduced; if on the other hand there is little agreement with
the plaintiff's position, the effect on property values will be much less. If then
the plaintiff can establish that defendant's conduct in violating the housing and
"2People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, X31 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59 (1892); Kaufman v. Stein, 138 Ind. 49,
37 N.E. 333 (1894). See I PoIERoY, EQUITABLE REMEDIES §478 (195o).
"aOn nuisance generally, see VI-A AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §28.25 (1954); Comment, 26
MICii. L. REV. 942 (1928).
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building code is tending to deteriorate the quality of the neighborhood, he should
be entitled to his private action to enforce the codes.
This method of private enforcement has one major disadvantage-equity pro-
ceedings are very expensive in most states. If the plaintiff-citizen prevails, he will
be awarded some costs but these do not include attorney's fees. 4 The field of "hous-
ing" offers evidence of two methods with which to meet this practical problem.
The first is to award attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff. In 1953 the
Illinois legislature, as part of its urban conservation program, authorized the court
to award reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the successful prosecution of an
injunction against violation of zoning laws0 The Illinois statute is of limited
utility because it applies only to zoning, but it is shrewd in conception because it
enlists the aid of another private enforcement group-the legal profession.
The second solution to the problem of costs of private injunction actions is to
permit the action to be brought by an association or group rather than an individual.
Thus, the Housing Act of 1954 prohibiting property on which there is an insured
loan to be used for hotel purposes provides in a new section 51306 of the National
Housing Act that "any person owning or operating a hotel" within a specified dis-
tance from the violating property or "any group or association of hotel owners or
operators" within the same area may bring a suit in federal court without regard to
diversity of citizenship to enjoin violation of the insured mortgagor's commitment
to FHA and the insured mortgagee. Permitting a neighborhood association to as-
sume responsibility for the suit relieves the property owner of problems of both cost
and time. Perhaps a Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Neighborhoods is needed
as much as a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.
One additional advantage of private actions of this type should be noted. Once
the action is commenced, a lis pendens may be filedOT and this is clearly an encum-
brance on the titie which the tide examining industry understands and checks for.
III
ENFORCEMENT BY MEANS OF INITIATION OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS BY PRIVATE PERSONS
Of course, one of the most common methods of both public and private enforce-
ment is complaint to the public officials by a private citizen followed by appropriate
proceedings initiated by the public agencies. Sometimes the private citizen can do
more than this-he may set the official machinery into motion. Thus, he may on oc-
casion be able to bring mandamus against an official to compel him to enforce the
planning laws. It would seem that the basis of such an action is substantially the
same as the basis of the private injunction mentioned above08
" But cf. Walter v. Danisch, 133 N.J.Eq. 127, 29 A.2d 897 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943) where plaintiff
was awarded attorney's fees on an award of a mandatory injunction.
0 ILL. Rav. STAr. C. 24, §73-9; Ill. Laws 1953, p. 431 (H.B. 609).
e' 68 Stat. 6 1o, 12 U.S.C.A. §1731b(i) (9.54 Supp.). See also Massachusetts statute referred to in
note 58, supra.
" Penataquit Ass'n v. Furman, Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co., N.Y.L.J. Nov. io, 1953, P. 1407, col. I.
"'Reem v. Daves, 31 Idaho 730, 175 Pac. 959 (1918) (mandamus to compel city to order demoi-
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In some cities, depending on the wording of the local charter or statute, the private
citizen may bring an information against the violator (where violation is a mis-
demeanor) in the name of the city, alleging violation of law.69 Further restrictions
may be imposed by court rules that if a complaint is made by a private citizen, he
must swear to the truth of his complaint and cannot allege a violation on informa-
tion and belief.70 While this seems a necessary check on "unfounded" and "spite"
complaints, it seriously limits the use of this remedy in connection with most plan-
ning legislation, particularly housing and building codes.
CONCLUSION
Private enforcement is an oft-overlooked vehicle for harassed residents witnessing
the decline of their neighborhood through the indifference and inability of city
officials towards enforcement of the planning laws; it is also an oft-overlooked remedy
for the harassed city official who does not have the staff to engage in systematic
and regular enforcement through the usual penalty procedure. Under laws as de-
scribed above the city official may, by cooperative arrangements with insurance com-
panies and mortgagees, obtain their aid in enforcing some types of planning laws.
Private enforcement could be strengthened if statutory changes clearly made viola-
tions a matter of title and a basis for ineligibility of mortgage investment by insti-
tutional lenders.
Perhaps one reason for not making greater use of these private means of en-
forcement is a hostility against private citizens turning "policeman." It is submitted
that planning is a peculiarly bad area for this attitude to dominate. The attitude
reflects a public belief that these measures are "police" measures designed to pre-
serve the peace of the community. Since a major objective in all planning legislation
is to regularize land use in order to preserve certain values economic and otherwise
in the area affected, planning is a peculiarly appropriate place for community satis-
factions in property ownership to express themselves. If the residents and property
owners of any area are not concerned about the protection of their own neighbor-
hood, there are few reasons which can be advanced as to why the city official should
be interested.P1
tion of building built in violation of ordinance); Garrou v. Teaneck Tryon Co., ii N.J. 294, 94 A.2d 332,
35 A.L.R.2d 1125 (1953) and Annotation.
O McQuiLLiN, op. cit. supra note 59, §27.08. The Illinois Cities and Villages Act (ILL. REV. STAT.
c. 24, §10-8 (595i)) provides: "A warrant for the arrest of an accused person may issue upon the
affidavit of any person that an ordinance has been violated; and that the person making the complaint
has reasonable grounds to believe that the party charged is guilty thereof." In City of Spokane v.
Robison, 6 Wash. 547, 33 Pac. 960 (1893) an information was filed by a private citizen complaining
of a violation of the slaughterhouse ordinance. This method of beginning was upheld even though the
City Charter provided that the City Attorney should conduct all prosecution. Contra: City of New
Rochelle v. Beckwith, 268 N.Y. 315, 197 N.E. 295, oo A.L.R. 99i (1935) (zoning ordinance). But cf.
Marcus v. Village of Mamaroneck, 283 N.Y. 325, 28 N.E.2d 856 (940).
"' See, e.g., Municipal Court Act of Chicago §27 (ILL. REV. STAT. c. 37, §382). The Corporation
Counsel of Chicago has ruled the section referred to in note 69 is controlling of this section. 21 OPs.
CoRp. COUNSEL OF CHICAGO 384 (1944).
" But 4. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' Ass',-, LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 247 (2d ed.
1948).
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Moreover, as Professor Ratcliffe pointed out in the article referred to at the be-
ginning of this paper,"2 if city planning is to affect city growth and development, it
must be because controls are imposed on market forces or its institutions subjected
to pressure. What better way to affect the market than to make use of factors already
affecting the free market-the lending and title examining institutions, and the atti-
tudes of buyers and sellers and users of land?
" See note i, supra.
